PEOPLE in the North-East have a strong affinity for Northern Rock. Until recently the bank was something of a standard bearer for our region.

It was one of only two FTSE 100 companies from the region and gave away £175m to good causes via the Northern Rock Foundation. People felt rightly proud of its achievements.

Because of that allure, some folk may be tempted to see the bank's current predicament through rose-tinted spectacles.

But nothing can hide the shambles that led to the Northern Rock crisis and no one should be above blame.

Today's report by the Treasury Select Committee makes pretty grim reading.

It blames the bank's directors for pursuing a "high risk" strategy and brands their business plan "reckless".

No doubt the directors would take issue with this conclusion - after all, they were doing fine until global events meant credit availability dried up almost overnight.

Larger financial institutions than Northern Rock have been caught out by the credit crunch.

Of more concern is the committee's scathing criticism of the so-called "tripartite system" of financial regulation set-up in 1997, which was supposed to prevent anything so disastrous as a run on a British bank.

It makes clear that the system, which shares responsibility between the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and the Treasury, failed its first big test.

It failed to spot the impending crisis, dithered when decisive action was required and failed to guarantee the bank's savings speedily enough, thereby precipitating those images of people queuing around the block to get their money. The tri-partite partners behaved like rabbits caught in the headlights of a speeding car.

Everyone involved in the Northern Rock debacle must share some of the responsibility, including the management, but the hesitation by the FSA and the Treasury almost certainly delivered the killer blow