Dr Christopher Davidson, a lecturer in Middle East politics at Durham University, explains what brought the region to war and why the invasion may be the prelude to an even greater conflict…

A TRAGIC new year has begun in Gaza. Hundreds of lives have been lost as Israeli bombs have rained down on the densely populated Palestinian territory.

Now, with Israeli land forces sweeping into Gaza City, the prospects for a ceasefire or any other form of peaceful settlement are looking bleak. Seemingly, nobody is prepared to come to the table. Tel Aviv has stated its commitment to a long and painful military solution.

With unrest in the United Nations, the cancelling of New Year festivities in most parts of the Middle East, and mass demonstrations taking place in western capitals - including London - the international community is both appalled and confused by the rapid and lethal chain of events.

But barring an unlikely US intervention there is little else that can be done from the outside.

Certainly the French and British attempts at diplomacy, including Tony Blair's frantic role as the Quartet's Middle East envoy, have made little progress.

The most substantial aspects of the confusion are the real identity of Israel's enemy and why Operation Cast Lead has had to happen now. This is neither a war against the Palestinian state nor against the Palestinian people, or at least it is not supposed to be.

Rather, it is a last gasp attempt by Israel to destroy Hamas – the political party in Gaza that is thought to pose the greatest threat to Israel's future security.

With the de facto blessing of the Bush administration to deal with problems in its own backyard, as evidenced by American neutrality in its 2006 campaign against Hezballah in southern Lebanon, Israel is seizing what may be its final window of opportunity for a military action. Undoubtedly, if Israel had waited any longer then the incoming Obama administration would have felt compelled to intervene.

Hamas, now in its twentieth year, is a party of the 'Islamic Resistance Movement' that has aimed to mobilise the Palestinian people under a religious banner of Sunni Islam.

Controversially, much like other political parties of resistance such as Hezballah and even Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, Hamas has felt justified in maintaining a large paramilitary organization – the Al-Qassam Brigade, ostensibly for the protection of its cause.

Also, as another parallel to Hezballah, Hamas has developed an extensive welfare state, providing health care and an education system for the residents of the towns in which it has held sway.

Undoubtedly, the strategy has brought Hamas much popularity, with large swathes of Palestinian society appreciative for at least a semblance of law and order and basic social services. In early 2006 the political wing of Hamas began to sweep the polls, winning 43 percent of the vote and a substantial number of seats in Palestinian parliamentary elections.

Soon it became clear that Hamas had overtaken the previous majority party – Fatah – to become Palestine's strongest voice.

By the summer of that year the two had come together to form a unity government, and by early 2007 efforts were being made to reduce factional infighting, although gunmen always remained on street corners. But Hamas' victory was far from assured when later that year a bitter civil war broke out between the two parties and their allies.

Fatah, which still controlled the Palestinian presidency and the police force given that Hamas had boycotted earlier elections, was effectively ousted from Gaza by the Hamas militia, thus turning the turbulent strip into an autonomous Palestinian enclave. The Fatah president, reduced to controlling only the West Bank, had little option but to declare Hamas'

militia an illegal entity and its political wing redundant.

Crucially, despite winning democratic elections and clearly winning the hearts and minds of so many Palestinians, Hamas has been unable to appease its internal enemies and the civil war has never been properly resolved.

Moreover, as evidenced by the current conflict, Israel remains focused on its destruction, and foreign governments have little sympathy for Hamas' plight.

Indeed, several countries including the US, Japan, and Canada classify Hamas as a terrorist organization, while others – including the UK and Australia – consider the Al-Qassam Brigade to be an illegal army.

The root of this antagonism lies in Hamas'

original manifesto. Much more than just a political party representing the religious community, its leaders have called for the destruction of the state of Israel, or more accurately the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and sharia law for its jurisprudence. 2007 was long ago prophesised to be the year that Israel would 'disappear' by Hamas' founder, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. This sets Hamas apart from Fatah, which is willing to accept a Jewish state, and also differentiates it from militia-wielding Hezballah, which has sought compromise solutions with other political parties.

Hamas' rocket attacks have done little to reverse regional and international opposition.

Seemingly in an effort to bolster its legitimacy amongst the Palestinian people and the broader Arab world, the Al-Qassam Brigade has fired hundreds of rockets into Israeli territory.

A ceasefire was signed in summer 2008, but this broke down in November, and the continuation of rocket fire has been used as the primary pretext for Israel's invasion.

As it stands, neither side can back down: Israel can only succeed if it wipes out Hamas, bringing attacks to an end and reshaping the Palestinian political landscape.

Hamas does not of course need to defeat Israel to win, as it has three other important options: simply surviving until Israel is exhausted, waiting for the new US administration arrives, or – most dangerously – managing to broaden the conflict to include Israel's many other enemies.

Worryingly the final option may be favoured by both sides. The rockets and weapons Hamas has been smuggling in through its underground tunnels are unquestionably supplied by Iran, as were Hezballah's in 2006.

Iran has everything to gain from fighting another low intensity proxy war against Tel Aviv, while Israel may well be seeking its opportunity to eliminate the looming Iranian nuclear threat.

Meanwhile Israeli tanks continue to pound the region and innocent people continue to die.

Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak said the offensive would go on until Israel achieved ‘‘peace and tranquility’’ for residents of southern Israel. Right now that prospect looks a very long way off.