A SERIES of operational failures and ignored orders in the days leading up to the slaughter of six Red Caps were laid bare at an inquest yesterday.

As a baying mob descended on the Royal Military Policemen in the southern Iraqi town of Al Majar Al Kabir, they had no way of calling for help and their commanders had no idea where they were.

The first their commanding officer knew of their whereabouts was when he was told their bodies were being recovered.

Corporals Paul Long, 24, originally from South Shields, South Tyneside, and Simon Miller, 21, from Washington, Wearside, and Lance Corporal Benjamin Hyde, 23, from Northallerton, North Yorkshire, died on June 24, 2003, in a ruined police station.

Sergeant Simon Hamilton-Jewell, 41, Corporal Russell Aston, 30, and Lance Corporal Thomas Keys, 20, were also killed.

The families of the six men listened in disbelief as Colonel Thomas Beckett told how a mob that had been repelled by paratroopers earlier in the day rampaged through the town, hunting coalition forces.

The inquest, in Oxford, was told:

l There were only 27 Iridium satellite telephones available to the 1,000 members of the 1 Para battle group in Maysan Province;

l Patrols were frequently sent out without a telephone because there were not enough to go around;

l Patrols of six men were sent up to 62 miles from base despite their standard issue vehicle radios having a range of only nine miles;

l A direct order from the commanding officer that each man carry 150 rounds of ammunition was breached. The six Red Caps were limited to 50 rounds each;

l Because of a lack of radio contact, units on patrol were effectively blind, with no way of knowing where their colleagues were and no way of contacting them.

Company Staff Sergeant Andrew Stainton said the six men had gone out too far that day for radio contact and had not taken an Iridium phone because there were not enough to go around.

Coroner Nicholas Gardiner asked him: "So, as second in command, there were lengthy periods of time when you really had no idea where your men were?"

Sgt Stainton replied: "Yes sir. Usually guys were back by late afternoon."

New orders, he said, restricted ammunition to 50 rounds each, adding: "Someone somewhere had drawn a line and said 'this is the end of the war operation'.

"Because we hadn't had any significant firefights it was deemed that this ammunition could be removed."

Col Beckett told the hearing that he had countermanded that order, decreeing each man should have 150 rounds - but that order was ignored.

He also ordered that every unit leaving headquarters in Al Amara should take an Iridium telephone with them, but that order was also breached.

The inquest heard that the lack of communications meant the Red Caps would not have known that Paras in their battle group were in the same area as them.

On the day of the murders, Col Beckett said he believed a unit of Paras had come under fire near the police station, but repelled the attack.

The mob may have then moved through the town and discovered the soldiers in the police station.

He said he believed a "mob mentality" had taken over in the town.

"My personal view is that there was a core of people who had decided to attack the coalition on that day, but once the first attack (on the Paras) occurred the rest of the town, those who were willing to join in, were whipped up."

He also said he believed that even with the satellite phone and Paras on the ground fighting their way through the streets to save them, their chances of survival were slim.

He added: "I regret to say that unless they could have held out, very regrettably they were going to die unless I could get to them."

The inquest continues.