Q1. Why does the council have so little correspondence and paperwork?

Is it normal practice not to keep files recording the authority’s involvement?

Q2. Why did the authority not finalise a signed contract with the project’s lead consultant, Gillespies?

Q3. Who was responsible for drawing up the terms of a contract described in the report as “extremely low risk” (for the contractor) “with very limited incentive for efficient working”?

Q4. Why was the contract arranged so that the authority shared 90 per cent of any savings or 90 per cent of any additional costs?

Q5. Who took the decision not to stick to works through the main pedestrian area? If the authority was concerned about disruption in the run-up to Christmas why did the work start at all?

Q6. Why did the authority opt to replace the gas pipe in its entirety rather than amend the scheme?

Q7. If the authority opted to replace the pipe to avoid further disruption at some point in the future why did it not include such work in the original plan?

Q8. How closely were council members involved in these decisions and how often were they briefed? Who was aware of the problems?

Q9. Why did the council opt to spend more money on a report by Ward Hadaway when its legal case was so weak?

Q10. What new measures are in place to ensure this does not happen again?

Darlington Borough Council only directly answered question ten. This is the authority’s response in full:

THE council has been open in its acknowledgement that the Pedestrian Heart was not well managed.

Since the completion of the scheme, there have been a number of direct changes in the way the council manages its major projects.

A new approach to project management has been introduced which ensures that every major project over £75,000 is monitored on a regular basis by staff and elected members.

The council has also recruited new staff who have the skills and experience required to manage the complex nature of these projects.

The current report on the scheme was compiled in response to a recommendation from the council’s resources scrutiny committee to explore whether some of the costs which made up the overspend on the scheme were correctly charged to the council – or whether the contractors should have met these costs under the contractual arrangements of the scheme.

The detailed information held in the report is yet to be made publicly available as it contains legal advice. If this advice is made generally known, it will potentially weaken any case by the council in any future action.

The report and the issues it raises will be debated fully at a meeting of the cabinet on Tuesday, October 6.

In answer to question ten:

KEY changes have been made.

Darlington council has established a separate office to manage the larger strategic projects within the council. This is staffed by experienced project managers.

In addition, all projects which are projected to cost over £75,000 are monitored on a monthly basis to see if they are on target in terms of time and budget.

This is reported within the council at the asset management and capital programme review board chaired by the Director of Corporate Finance.

This information is also reported to cabinet and resources scrutiny committee on a quarterly basis and monitor projects at all stages from early inception, through construction to post completion evaluation.

In addition, the larger strategic projects all have project boards that also monitor their respective projects.

These actions have all been implemented on our current capital schemes, such as our new school buildings, and housing projects.

PEDESTRIAN HEART: COUNTING EVERY BEAT

November 2002: Plans for Pedestrian Heart project to revolutionise Darlington town centre are revealed and subsequently approved by the cabinet.

June 2003: The council advertises for an urban design consultant to create the Pedestrian Heart July 2003: Nineteen companies contact the council in the first month; but the project suffers its first delay because of European Union procedures.

October 2003: Gillespies chosen to lead a team of consultants to draw up plans.

March 2004: Gillespies reveals plans which are bigger than first envisaged for the project; Gillespies also to conduct radar surveys as part of examination work.

June 2004: A public exhibition of the £6.5m plans go on show in the Cornmill Centre.

November 2004: Cabinet approves the plans in five minutes to the fury of protestors who fear it will ruin 100 years of heritage.

December 2004: Plans are put on temporary hold for further examination into funding for the project.

January 2005: Planning application formally submitted March 2005: Project is approved by planning committee despite civic trust projects expected to be opened.

April 2005: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister gives the final step of approval for work to start October 2005: Birse Civils starts work on Pedestrian Heart.

January 2006: First areas of new town centre are unveiled by contractors.

January 2006: Project suffers its first major setback after a gas main is discovered at a more shallow depth than first thought when a mechanical digger breaks the pipe.

February 2006: Gillespies suggest the street works should be modified to accommodate the gas main; the council decides to replace the gas main rather than amend the design.

March 2006: Extent of setback is revealed to be at an extra cost of between £680,000 and £780,000 and up to four more months beyond finishing date.

April 2006: Council orders an investigation into the gas pipe setback by its own scrutiny committee.

June 2006: Contractors dig into water pipe leaving businesses without a supply for a number of hours.

June 2006: Council bosses reveal they are looking at the possibility of suing contractors because of delays caused by the gas main August 2006: The council sets up an £80,000-a-year position to manage captial projects following a review of the delays during the Pedestrian Heart scheme.

September 2006: Costs of the project are revealed to have risen to £8.5m and possibly to £9.2m June 2007: Life Pulse feature is switched on to celebrate finish of work on the Pedestrian Heart project.

September 2007: Investigation report into Birse costs is produced by E C Harris showing Birse was paid the correct amount.

December 2007: E C Harris advises further investigations should be carried out.

September 2009: Confidential report sent to cabinet members outlining details of errors and inability to take legal action.