Who will pay for peace in Iraq?

The discussions in Brussels between the US, the United Nations and European governments including the UK, reinforce the ultimate dilemma for Tony Blair, that there is no consensus as to how post-Saddam Iraq will be run, and by whom.

Indeed, the French, German and Russian governments are positively hostile to paying for what they see as a problem largely created by the British and US without a UN mandate. Blair is rightly seeking UN support and intervention, in contrast to a Bush administration that increasingly regards the UN as an historical irrelevance.

The alarm bells over this potential human catastrophe have been ringing for several months, if not years. Christian Aid's Roger Riddell gave evidence in March to the House of Commons International Development Committee (IDC) and said: " I am worried about a line of questioning which suggests we do the war and then worry about the humanitarian consequences afterwards. The Geneva Conventions require that those who engage in military activity focus on civilians right from the start."

And Claire Short told the House of Commons prior to her threatened resignation: "The simplistic view that we should get on with the war, after which my department and a few people can clean up, is ill-informed. I and my department have been fully engaged in trying to get the world to face the humanitarian risks and make preparations."

The Prime Minister has told the House that there needs to be an humanitarian plan that is every bit as viable and well worked out as a military plan. However, the cross-party IDC concluded that they are yet to be convinced that this is the case.

It is possible to discuss scenarios but foolish to make predictions as to the outcome of this conflict in terms of time, damage to infrastructure, the civilian population and not least, the cost of reparation and who is likely to pick up the bill. The first question to be asked on the morning after the war before, is who is in charge? Sanctions were imposed on Iraq in response to its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. An "oil for food" programme was first implemented in 1996. Under the programme, Iraq is permitted to sell set amounts of oil to fund the purchase of food. On March 28, Tony Blair will have breathed a sigh of relief as the UN Security Council agreed to adjust this programme to assist the Government of Iraq in relation to the humanitarian needs of its people. It is a sign that the UN may not be turning its back on post-Saddam Iraq.

As envisaged by the Prime Minister, in the long term, the Iraqi people must be allowed to create their own political and economic development models and their own strategies for tackling poverty. Most importantly, Iraqis must be able to participate in designing and implementing development plans at community level. But to do all of this, they will need a strong and long-term commitment from the international community to rebuilding Iraq.

The international community must actively engage in promoting and supporting a democratic and pluralistic society in Iraq, free from internal repression.

It should give its support to political settlements which address Iraq's internal conflicts and which guarantee the human rights of the different ethnic groups within Iraq's borders. In preparing to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Iraq, the UK Government should remember the experience of Afghanistan where the US approach of supporting regional power holders fuelled warlords and created barriers in security and stability. The bestcase scenario for military action is of course, that Iraq surrenders with central authority structures remaining intact.

However, it is essential that in planning for the possible humanitarian consequences of military action, the worst case scenario, involving ethnic conflict, be considered. Safe havens could be a useful mechanism for preventing ethnic conflict, but who and how people are protected is yet to be agreed. Part of this process must incorporate the investigation of perpetrators of past human rights abuses, who must be brought to justice.

A big question is what to do with the oil fields which have been occupied. There has been some talk in hawkish US think-tanks of using proceeds from the "new Iraq's" oil reserves to fund the costs of "liberation". In this way, the words of Bush and Blair emphasising that Iraqi oil will remain a resource for the Iraqis, will in fact amount to no more than using Iraqi oil revenue to repair damage inflicted by the war, without the US treasury paying for it.

Rival Kurdish groups and the Turks may come to blows over the rich fields around Kirkuk, an area which Saddam has "cleansed" of its original Kurdish and Turkmen population. Increasing oil production or restoring production will be slow, and will depend on foreign investment.

Additionally, who will decide what to do about Iraq's billions in debts, for example to the dissenting Russians and French? If there were to be an increase in Iraqi oil production as a result of events in Iraq, Iraq's re-integration into the world's oil market would need to be carefully planned in order to avoid adverse effects on those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices.

On the morning after Saddam goes, there will be an immediate need for large-scale international assistance to rebuild and provide relief. The costs of rebuilding the infrastructure, even in the absence of major war damage, are likely to be huge. A donors' conference, such as that which followed the victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, is the usual first resort of the international community. But the Afghan donors' conference was notable for pledges that were never redeemed, and given resentment in Europe over US and British policies in Iraq, a major contribution by the EU would be a surprise.

Faced with these alternatives, and given the US Defence Department's distaste for nation building, a possible "exit stategy" would be to toss the ball to Iraqis as soon as possible (something which Blair is promoting).

This was the course the US aimed at in Bosnia, believing that elections within a year would enable NATO forces to withdraw. As we learned to our regret, premature elections merely aggravated the problem.

In March, the IDC emphasised that a lead role for the UN is paramount after hostilities. It concluded that: "Based on the evidence we heard, the scale of the humanitarian need may well exceed the capacity of the international system."

The UN must be urged to clarify its attitude to engaging with the enormity of the problems surrounding post-Saddam Iraq, in terms of refugees, humanitarian aid and the rebuilding of Iraq. The military role should be limited to providing policing and protection, according to the IDC. It is important that the UN should have the lead role in a post-conflict Iraq as soon as possible. There is a real danger that donors would not play a full part in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq if the country were administered by a military governor, as the US may well seek.

However the war is won, the winning of the peace may prove to be a longer and more desperate struggle, not merely for Iraq, but for the future of the world in the 21st century.

05/04/2003