A very British mess

BRITAIN’S defence procurement policy has been a laughing stock for decades. From guns that can’t shoot, to desert boots that melt in the heat and helicopters that can’t fly, the Armed Forces have suffered years of equipment failures.

Shortly before the invasion of Iraq, the Ministry of Defence admitted many of its tanks weren’t capable of operating in a desert environment.

The reason? Because expensive work to convert them had been cancelled to save money.

The MoD had banked £23m by not modifying its Challenger 2 tanks for operations in sand.

But, during an exercise in Oman that was also a test of combat readiness for Iraq, half of them broke down. Air filters clogged, choking off the engines, while wheels and tracks wore out and spares were quickly exhausted. A £1m battlefield artillery gun caught fire when it overheated and had to be written off. The repair costs – and the need to reactivate the conversion programme in double-quick time – left the MoD with a far larger bill.

It was the same story with the much-delayed Clansman radio communications equipment, which proved so hopeless that squaddies resorted to hand signals.

The Tories pledged to shake up defence spending. Then defence secretary Liam Fox criticised what he called “a conspiracy of optimism based on poor cost estimation and unrealistic timescales”. He said: “These practices would simply not be tolerated in the private sector, and they will no longer be tolerated in the MoD.”

However, when the last review was conducted last year, the 15 most expensive defence projects were still running £8.8bn over budget and have been delayed by a total of 32 years.

The design of the Navy’s aircraft carriers was pretty much nailed down by the time David Cameron arrived in Downing Street, but a defence review gave politicians a chance to reconsider. Encouraged by the French – who hoped to “share” our carriers when their ageing flat-top, the Charles de Gaulle, was pensioned off – the new Government ripped up the plans.

Instead of buying the jump jet version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Coalition opted for the conventional take-off F-35C version.

The ships had to be modified because the conventional F-35 could only launch from a carrier with the help of a hydraulic catapault.

DESPITE the extra costs, the Prime Minister was adamant he was doing the right thing. In October 2010, he said: “The carriers were unable to work effectively with our key defence partners, the US or France... (Labour) ordered the more expensive and less capable version of the joint strike fighter to fly off the carriers. Today we will act in the national interest.

“We will fit the “cats and traps” – the catapults and arrester gear – (which) will allow our allies to operate from our operational carrier.

It will allow us to buy the carrier version of the joint strike fighter, which is more capable, less expensive, has a longer range and carries more weapons. We will also aim to bring the planes and the carriers in at the same time.”

As the costs continued to climb, this began to look like a mistake. As of this year, the cost of alterations had soared to £2bn and the aircraft would not have been operational until 2023 – three years later than planned. Worse, leaked Pentagon documents claimed a design flaw had left the F-35C unable to land on a ship.

The arrester hook that prevented it from overshooting and crashing into the sea was too close to the plane’s wheels. After eight simulated carrier landings ended in disaster, the report concluded the future of the aircraft was at risk without a significant redesign.

Yesterday, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond confirmed the Government is to drop plans for the F-35C and will buy the jump jet instead. Nearly 18 months and £50m later, we are back to square one.

Defence projects are complex and difficult to pin down. The lead times run into many years and the technology is constantly changing. So are the military’s requirements. Who could foresee the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War? Or the 9/11 terror attacks? Or even the invasion of the Falkland Islands?

Against this background, it is remarkable that the Armed Forces ever get what they need.

Ironically, although the latest U-turn may be painful, it could turn out to be a masterstroke.

Although the F-35B has a shorter range due to its vertical flight systems and a lower weapons payload, a V-STOL (vertical-short take off and landing) supercarrier has numerous advantages over its conventional cousins.

US carrier battle groups were often surprised by the way Britain’s Invincible class “Harrier carriers” were able to conduct flying operations in weather that grounded their catapault launched aircraft. Strategically, the change makes sense, too. The F-35B will be ready years before the F-35C – so the Navy will not be in the embarrassing position of operating an aircraft carrier with no aircraft.

MICHAEL DUGHER, the shadow minister for defence equipment, proposes a three-point plan to end waste. Firstly, contracts should always incentivise productivity and penalise delays.

Secondly, the MoD should adopt an open contracting policy, which makes it easier to see where the money is going. Finally, he believes Britain should concentrate on shorter, less complex projects.

Of course, it’s easy to be wise when you’re in opposition. The third point, in particular, would be a political hot potato because it means buying more “off-the-peg” equipment from foreign companies.

This was a very British mess – a Government that could not make up its mind, an aircraft that may never work and a Navy desperate for new carriers. So far the MoD has muddled through in the hope of “getting there in the end”.

No doubt, there will be other problems along the way before HMS Queen Elizabeth enters service in 2016. For Britain’s sake, we can only hope they aren’t as big.