Will the package of reforms offer to Britain by the EU be enough to prevent a Brexit? Professor Thom Brooks isn’t so sure

THE EU referendum on whether Britain will remain or leave is one of the most important many of us will make in our lifetimes. If only it was that simple. What should be a decision about our shared political future is being twisted into a verdict on the personal legacy of one person: David Cameron.

Cameron’s real aim for the EU referendum is clear from the start. In 2013, he promised a vote on the EU if the Conservatives won the next General Election. He said the country would debate the arguments "in favour and against the arrangement we negotiate" – and not the arrangement Britain has already.

Cameron remains on message more than two years later. He made clear in announcing his proposals that: "It will be your decision whether to remain in the EU on the basis of the reforms we secure, or whether we leave". For Cameron, this isn’t a referendum about Europe, but about his political leadership.

To be fair, he knew this was never going to be easy and claimed to have "no illusions about the scale of the task ahead". Finding meaningful changes that all other 27 EU leaders and the EU Parliament can accept is more difficult than finding a needle in a large haystack. Cameron has done well to have any proposal on the table at all.

But if he succeeds – and there is every possibility that he won’t – Cameron’s EU reforms increase the risks that the UK will Brexit. We only need to look at the deal on offer. Neither friend nor foe can deny that Cameron’s new deal is a complex mix of ifs, ands and buts intelligible to a few beyond seasoned Eurocrats and civil servants. If you confuse voters, you lose elections – and Cameron’s EU reforms become more obscure the closer you look.

Cameron’s "emergency brake" is a key part of his new EU deal. The prime minister said recently that "people coming to Britain from the EU must live here and contribute for four years before they qualify for in-work benefits or social housing’.

This tough sounding rhetoric is divorced from the reality – and its workings about as clear as North Korean rocket science. Cameron’s brake can only be used if the EU gives a green light. The UK must convince other members that a stop on benefits is "necessary" because of the pressures from specifically EU migration with data Britain does not have. An emergency brake will be only a temporary measure.

Cameron’s brake is not only short-term but "proportionate". The EU can agree an emergency brake is used in the UK or some other member state limiting it to just a year or two – four years is the maximum and not the mandatory time frame. If EU leaders agreed to this reform, the brake would likely be used rarely and perhaps only a year or two at most – while migrants receive a growing share of benefits during this period. Not quite what Cameron led many to believe.

Cameron’s brake is meant to put a stop to child benefits for EU migrants, too. He said: "We should end the practice of sending child benefit overseas". But now we learn that any cap would not apply to any of the 150,000 or more EU migrants already in Britain – not one. Another clear statement that is anything but when you see the fine print.

Another key part of the EU reforms is a ‘red card’ for unwanted laws. But his proposal is more like a red card that does not always get players off the pitch. All 28 EU countries have twelve weeks to get 55 per cent or more ‘of the votes allocated to national Parliaments’ to stop it. This is as difficult to achieve as it is to understand. But it gets worse.

Each Parliament that votes against a law must state its ‘reasoned opinions’ for it. Rejecting a proposed EU law is not enough – and a point missed by everyone thus far. The European Council can then either let the bill die or it can ‘accommodate the concerns expressed’ through amending the bill so it can then become law.

Cameron’s two flagship reforms can be summarised as an "emergency brake" only operated by other drivers that doesn’t bring cars to a stop – and a "red card" that doesn’t throw all players off the pitch. Reforms they are; meaningful or readily intelligible they are not. The initial polls post-EU deal are not looking good.

When first announcing a referendum, Cameron said: “It is hard to argue that the EU would not be greatly diminished by Britain’s departure.” The big problem he faces is that we might say the same about him.

Cameron wanted a referendum about his legacy as well as the UK’s place in Europe. In tying them together, he risks losing both. Cameron’s best hope of seeing the UK in EU is to recognise its future does not depend on his new deal. Perhaps he can better achieve his future legacy by dropping the reforms that were to be its foundation. But this may be an act of statesmanship too much.

Professor Thom Brooks is Professor of Law and Government at Durham Law School.